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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant and Respondent, Pines Ranch, Inc., referred
to hereafter as defendant, has been sued herein by the Appellants
hereafter called plaintiffs, in a declaratory judgment action
wherein plaintiffs allege that they are the owners of a 40-acre
tract of land located in Section 34, Township 1 North, Range 7
East, Summit County, Utah, which is surrounded by property owned
by the defendant.

They allege that a "road" to plaintiffs1

property does now exist and has for many years existed across
the defendant's land, and that it has been used for "logging
and general access" to plaintiffs1 property.
does not state who allegedly

(The Complaint

used this "road" nor the extent

of such alleged use nor the location thereof.)

Plaintiffs seek

a declaratory judgment that they have a prescriptive easement to
use this "road" and seek a restraining order preventing defendant
from interferring with such use. No order to show cause or other
preliminary proceedings were had seeking a temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A motion for summary judgment made by the plaintiffs
was argued (with supporting and opposing affidavits and memoranda) to the Hon. James S. Sawaya, and the motion was denied.
Thereafter the matter came on for trial before the Hon. Stewart
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M. Hanson, Sr., hearing the matter in Salt Lake City, beginning
at 1:30 P.M. on January 6, 1976, pursuant to request of Court
and stipulation of counsel, due in part to inclement weather.
(T-2). At the conclusion of plaintiffs1 evidence, defendant
moved to dismiss, and the Court took the motion under advisement.

At the conclusion of the trial, the Court (after all the

evidence was in and the case had been argued and submitted by
all parties) granted said motion.

(R-31, 34-37).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The ruling of the trial court was proper; the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof to establish an
easement by prescription.

The judgment below should be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs' State of Fact is selective and in at
least four instances is totally misleading, which will be pointed
out initially.

Additional relevant facts not mentioned in the

plaintiffs1 Brief are then set forth in this Statement of Facts
and to some extent in the Argument hereafter.
Plaintiffs, in the second paragraph of their Statement
of Fact (their Brief, page 2) in its final sentence, say:

"The

property was deeded subject to any easement or right of way of
the public, even at that time." presumably suggesting thereby
that there was an existing easement to plaintiffs' property.
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Although Exhibit 9-P is the deed through which plaintiffs claim,
and although it does contain the statement that said conveyance
is "subject to any easement or right of way of the public, to
use all such highways as may have been established" across said
tract, such language is totally irrelevant and immaterial to
this lawsuit because:
1.

The deed does not purport to declare that there

is any right of way in fact.

It says "as may have been estab-

lished", (Emphasis added.)
2.

It deals only with rights of way to which said

tract is subject.

(It does not deal with rights of way bene-

fitting said tract.)
3.

It deals only with the rights of the public.

Although the facts of this case fail to show any such public
right of way, even if there were such, that could not be the
basis of support to a claimed private right of way.

In the

case of. Chournos v. Alkema, 27 Ut 2d 244, 494 P 2d 950 (1972) ,
the Supreme Court of Utah held:
"One cannot claim a right of way as a private one
by showing that it has been used by the public; he
must show user by himself or his predecessors of
the way to his own lot."
At page 3 of their Brief, plaintiffs claim that the
plaintiff, George Q. Nielsen, used the property for "logging".
Plaintiffs1 counsel cites no reference to the record to substantiate the claim, and indeed there is no evidence to that
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effect unless removal of a Christmas tree constitutes logging,
as the most that can be said from the record is that Mr. Nielsen
occasionally cut a tree/ usually at Christmas time, and presumably
(with the exception that hereafter appears) upon his own property.
In the final paragraph of plaintiffs1 Statement of
Fact, it is averred that "Shortly before this lawsuit was filed,
the defendant began interferring with plaintiffs1 access to the
property, and the plaintiffs filed this action for declaratory
judgment."

Again no reference to the transcript is made to

substantiate that assertion and it is misleading if intended to
imply that defendant acquiesced or failed to object to trespass
of defendants prior thereto.

All the evidence shows that a fence

along the western boundary of Section 34 had been in existence
at least since 1940 (T-85) and that after—not before—the lawsuit was filed (specifically on October 4, 1975) the barbed wire
gate in the existing fence was replaced with a chain and padlock
by Mr. Matheson, who was a co-owner of four lots (No. 32, 33, 34
and 35) abutting said fence and gate to the west of Section 34
(which lots were located in the Pine Mountain Subdivision and
were acquired by him and his partners in June 1971.) (T-66-69)•
The boundary was thus protected by fence and gate since 1940 or
before (T-85), and the objections of defendant to trespassing
by plaintiffs and others has been incontrovertibly of long standing.
(T-113, 94), and it is not something that occurred just before
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this lawsuit was commenced.
4.
fact:

Plaintiffs state at page 3 of their Brief as

"In 19 38, Virgil Smith, a resident of Summit County,

used the property for logging and used an established roadway
across the Curt Wilde property to remove the logs."

That is

plaintiffs1 "left-handed" way of trying to get before the Court
a statement that was not presented in evidence before Judge
Hanson, specifically an affidavit of one Virgil Smith, which
was used in connection with plaintiffs1 motion for summary judgment, but which was not verified or introduced or offered by
counsel at the trial. No opportunity, of course, was afforded
the defendant and its counsel to cross-examine Mr. Smith or to
determine when or where or how (or even if) he logged and across
what property, if any, he traversed in taking out his timber.
In any event his connection, if any, to the owner of the property
remains a mystery, and his activity, if any, cannot help them.
In that connection, plaintiffs did move the admission
of an affidavit of Ethel Gibbons, and the Court erroneously and
over the objection of defendant did admit it. (T-64).

Plaintiffs

had adduced from Mrs. Gibbons1 nephew, one Robert E. Walsh, (who
was a witness) that Mrs. Gibbons is an elderly person and has
periods of lucidity and others of incoherence.

No effort was

made by plaintiffs to establish Mr. Walsh as an expert on mental
conditions, and no effort was made to ascertain or prove her state
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of mind or provide foundation as to her lucidity as of July 5,
1974, when the said affidavit was purported to have been executed.
Apparently, the Court below gave said affidavit no credence.
(Otherwise, admission of said affidavit would constitute prejudicial error.)

In terms of supporting plaintiffs1 position,

it contains but one statement, and that is:

"During my lifetime,

my family and I have had occasion to utilize the roadway into
the Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 34,
for purposes of taking out timber, grazing sheep, picnicking
and other purposes."

(R-ll).

She then continued, "The roadway

that we commonly called Shinglemill Canyon Road was the only
means of getting to the property described above.

Other people

used it besides me and my family, and I have specific recollection
of having used it personally in excess of Forty (40) years."
Nothing in the affidavit indicates when the purported 40 years
began or ended, nor whether it was continuous and uninterrupted,
nor in what capacity she used it.
The testimony of Mr. Walsh, Ethel Gibbons1 nephew, was
that he, in company with his uncle (Mrs. Gibbons' husband) went
annually to the said area to cut a Christmas tree each year
until 1952, and from that time on has not been on it.

(He wasn't

actually sure he went to the property in question, however.)
(T-54).

It is further important to note that plaintiff, Nielsen,

got a deed to the subject property in 1966.

He testified that
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there was a contract of purchase of the property in existence
as early as 1962.(T-8, 9). So there is a dearth of evidence,
testimony or otherwise, with the exception of the nebulous
"40" years referred to in Ethel Gibbons1 inadmissible affidavit
showing any use by the plaintiffs or their predecessors in
interest of the purported easement or right of way prior to
1962.

There has not been a 20-year period elapse since 1962

to the present, but in any case the activity of plaintiffs
relating to this property has only been sporadic at best since
1962.
The defendant's witnesses, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Lund and
Mr. Rogerson, all testified that the "road" running easterly
from the gate in the boundary fence was there principally for
the purpose of servicing an irrigation canal for the downstream
water-rights owners

(who were principally the Stevens family

and Mr. Wilde and their predecessors).

(T-25, 77, 85). In

addition, Mr. Rogerson testified that on one occasion, the
predecessor in ownership of 2 00 acres of the Pines Ranch, one
Curtis Wilde, (who sold those acres to Pines Ranch in 1957)
(T-83) asked permission of the defendant to take timber off the
land one time in the year that he sold it.

In doing so, he

actually cut the "road" as such to a loading dock he built where
he brought the logs and loaded them on to conveyances. (T-84, 85).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Mr. Rogerson was specifically asked, "Did the 'road1 run to
the Ethel Gibbons property?"
(T-84,85).

His response was, "It did not."

He later said the "road" ends at the loading dock

and that is approximately 150 to 200 yeards from the plaintiffs1
property. (T-89).

Mr. Lund testified that the "road" turns into

a "horse-trail" well before reaching plaintiffs1 property. (T-80).
Mr. Stevens described the "road" as a "horse-trail". (T-25).

Mr.

Scott Matheson testified that the way was not honestly a road.
(T-73).

One of the plaintiffs, Ronald Harrington, testified he

had used the "road" twice, both times occurring in 1975, and that
the "road" narrows to a "path". (T-47).
In short, all of the competent witnesses acknowledge
that what was a road to service a canal and in one instance to
provide access to load some logs cut by a predecessor of the
defendant (not of plaintiffs) is being claimed now by the plaintiffs
as a right of way to their property for general access, on the
strength of two crossings on foot by plaintiff, Harrington, and
the sporadic cutting of Christmas trees and hauling the same across
said way by the plaintiff, Nielsen.
The evidence further showed that in order to get to the
gate in the said fence, one would have to cross the land formerly
owned by the Stevens family, but subdivided in 1965 as Pine
Mountain Estates. (T-27).

In that connection, Mr. Stevens testi-

fied that if people (other than the Stevens) used that route,
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they would have been trespassing. (T-31).

He also said that

only lot-owners and subdivision developers have keys issued to
them, and that Mr. Stevens had given no key at any time to the
plaintiff, George Q. Nielsen. (T-34).

He testified finally that

prior to the subdivision when the property vas owned by his family
(then doing business ad the Brooklawn Creamery) that there was
a gate on the Shingle Mill Road, which vas locked most of the time.
(T-38).

The following questions and answers were then elicited

at page 38 of the transcript:
"Q.
This gate now has a "No Trespass" sign on it, has
it not?
A.

Yes.

Q.
Do you remember whether there was a similar "No
Trespass" sign on the gate before the subdivision?
A.

I donft recall.

Q.
But the Shingle Mill Road has never, during the
period of your ownership, has never been open to the
public for people to needlessly go in and out, is that
correct?
A.
No, not in the twenty-five years that we have
owned it."
Mr. Harrington testified that on several occasions
between 1971 and 1975, he went into plaintiffs' property.

He

testified that he went on foot from the Weber Canyon Road except
on one occasion he was let in the Pine Mountain Estates gate by
someone who was there at the time he arrived and drove his car to
the boundary fence separating Pine Mountain Estates from Pines Ranch.
(T-44,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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49).

As noted above, in October of 1975, Mr. Matheson put in a

padlock and chain on the fence separating Section 34 from the
Pine Mountain Estates lots and delivered keys to Pines Ranch and
to the Stevens. (T-68,69).

He was expressly asked it he gave

any permission to any of the plaintiffs or copies or sets of
keys to any of them to which he replied universally

in the

negative. (T-69).
Finally, in the Statement of Facts, counsel wishes to
call to the Court's attention the fact that just as Mr. Stevens
testified that a "No Trespassing" sign appeared out at the Weber
Canyon Highway bordering Section 33, so did Mr. Rogerson testify
that at the main entrance to Pines Ranch at the north edge of
Section 34, which faces the Weber Canyon Highway, a similar
"No Trespassing" sign exists and has been in place for more than
20 years.

Mr. Rogerson further testified that admittedly there

is not a "No Trespassing" sign at the gate or along the fence
separating Section 34, the Pines Ranch property, from the Pine
Mountain Estates property (Section 33) because "we expected
no one else to use the property except the Stevens people and
ourselves." (T-92,93).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE USE CLAIMED
BY PLAINTIFFS WAS SPORADIC ONLY AND INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW
SUCH REGULAR, OPEN, NOTORIOUS, CONTINUOUS AND ADVERSE
USE AS TO ESTABLISH AN EASEMENT BY PRESCRIPTION.
Plaintiffs brought this action as a declaratory judgment action (R-l) seeking to have the court declare that they
are entitled to a right of way across the defendant's property,
which they claim to have acquired by "20 years prescriptive use."
(T-4).
As to the proper rule of appellate review, we refer
the court to the case of London Guarantee and Accident Co. vs.
Frazee, a£ 112 Ut 91, 185 P 2d 284 (1947), which involved an action
for a declaratory judgment, and in that case, the Supreme Court
of Utah held at page 96 that the rule of appellant review was
as follows:
"Our duty is to affirm the judgment of the trial
court if, after a search of the record, we conclude
there is substantial, competent evidence to sustain
its findings. Even though we might have come to a
different decision had we originally heard the action,
we cannot now substitute our judgment for that of
the trial court."
In support of this, we cite the cases of Jensen v.Gerrard. 85
Ut 481, 39 P 2d 1070 (1935) and Norback vs. Board of Directors,
84 Ut 506, 37 P 2d 339 (1934), which are cases involving prescriptive easements and in which the court held that prescriptive
easement cases were in law. See, however, Richins v. Struhs,
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17 Ut 2d 356, 412 P 2d 314 (1966). where the court proceeds in
equity.

It is, however, respectfully submitted that even under

equitable principles of review the same result is inevitable
in this case.
The plaintiffs, throughout their Brief, frequently
and freely assert that the plaintiffs established their prescriptive easement by clear and undisputed testimony.

We submit that

a careful search of the record reveals that the plaintiffs'
contentions are not only disputed by credible, competent, substantial evidence, but that plaintiffs1 own testimony, even if
considered by itself, is anything but convincing or clear.

We

have canvassed the record carefully and submit that the following
is a fair summary of all of the evidence which conceivably bears
upon the use of the property in question by plaintiffs and their
predecessors or privies and upon the question of ingress and
egress by such persons across the property of the defendant:
1.

Plaintiff, George Q. Nielsen, testified that he

went on the property (with the person from whom he later purchased
it) in 1961, which was one year before he purchased the same.
(T.-10) .
2.

George Q. Nielsen testified that he had the

property surveyed in 1962 at the time he acquired it. (T-12).
3.

George Q. Nielsen testified, when asked what uses

he had put the property to, as follows: "Well, we rode horses up
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in there we have hired on many occasions. We have cut timber.
We have taken out trees, and we have cut Christmas trees every
year." (T-12).

With reference to this statement, Nielsen is

not asked, nor does he state, how many times he used it nor what
route of ingress or egress, nor the means of transportation
(except that one could perhaps infer that he went by horseback
at times.)

Nielsen does testify that he used the gate at the

northwest of the property belonging to the Pines (entering
through the Stevens property to get there. (T-17). With reference
to said supposed "road", Nielsen states as follows at page 13 of
the transcript:
"Q.
Would you please for the Court describe the
nature of the roadway, and I am looking at 1962
when you purchased the property. Describe the
nature of the roadway from the time you crossed
the Smith and Moorehouse stream until you got as
close to your property as you could on the roadway.
Tell us at the start of it.

'

A.
It was a regular canyon-type of rough dirt,
graveled road that ran up that, ran up Shingle Mill,
was clearly defined, and then it is true it never,
going to my property was clearly defined but as
you got to the edge of the Pines Ranch you could
3
clearly see trails for a car and we have driven a
car when we have— Well, the fire department used,
and we have driven a quarter-ton truck to get into
it. The terrain became more of a trail and you could
see that they hauled timber out of there and driven
wagons out of there, and I could get to my property
at any time with a four-wheel drive and with clearing
a little foliage I could drive a car."
If Nielsen drove his "four-wheel drive" vehicle into the property
more than once, he is careful not to say so.
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4.

George Q. Nielsen testified that he went hunting

in the area in 19 56 and 1957, which was five years before he
acquired the property.

There is no testimony, however, that

such vists were in any way authorized by the then owner. (T-19).
5.

Defendant, Ronald Harrington, testified that he

had been on the property several times between 1971 and 1975.
He testified that the first time he went in from the Pines north
gate and that in May or June 1975 he came in over the Stevens
property through the gate at the northwest corner twice. (T-42, 43).
6.

Robert C. Walsh testified that he had been to the

area about one time each year from 19 36 to 19 52 to get Christmas
trees.

Walsh testified that hp was a nephew of a former owner,

but he admitted that he did not actually know the location of
of the property, but assumed that they were on the proper tract
in obtaining the Christmas trees. (T-54).
7.

Walsh also testified that he had been hunting in

the area, but did not know whether he was on the property in
question or not, nor did he testify that he was there by authority
of the then owners. (T-54).
8.

William Ray Hauter testified that he was a lieu-

tenant in the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department and co-worker
of plaintiff, George Q. Nielsen.

He testified that he went upon

the property in question 6 or 7 times with Nielsen to obtain
Christmas trees and to hunt grouse and testified that these visits
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commenced approximately seven years ago. He testified that they
had gone by car as far as the gate at the northwest fenceline, but
not by car beyond (T-59, 61) .

In response to the question as to

how far from the fence an automobile could be driven (going
east) he said at page 61 of the transcript:
A.
Well, this would be difficult. There was an
old roadway there. It appeared to be a roadway.
It hadn't been used probably for vehicular traffic
for sometime, but it was a road. Probably could
have driven a short distance on that, yes.
This seems to contradict Nielsen's testimony about going to the
property by motor vehicle or at least tends to show such an event
to have been isolated and remote.
9.

The Court, over the objection of the defendant,

admitted the affidavit of Ethel Gibbons. (T-64).

Testimony in

this form is clearly inadmissible and would be prejudicial and
reversible error if indeed the Court had relied upon same.
Mrs. Gibbons was unable to come to

(If

court, her testimony should

have been secured by deposition, assuming competency.

As it is,

defendants never were given an opportunity to cross-examine and
there is no showing of her mental capacity at the time she made
the affidavit in any event.) Actually the affidavit does not
materially assist the plaintiffs.
concurred with this view.

The trial court apparently

The affidavit, so far as the issues

of this lawsuit are concerned, says that Ethel Gibbons and her
family used the roadway into the property for purposes of taking
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out timber, grazing sheep, picnicking and other purposes.

It

further states that Ethel Gibbons personally used what she
termed "Shinglemill Canyon Road" for in excess of 40 years.
(see paragraphs 2 and 3 of the affidavit.)

She does not, how-

ever, state in her affidavit what roadway she is referring to
in paragraph 2, and although she does refer to the name of a
roadway in paragraph 3 as being "Shinglemill Canyon Road",
there is no way of determining what Ethel Gibbons understood
to be the "Shinglemill Canyon Road" is it relates to a supposed
prescriptive easement across the Pines Ranch.

There is no way

of determining what, in her mind, the situs of the road would
be.

Furthermore, although she states that she personally used

this road for in excess of 40 years, we are not told what 40
years is meant, and we are not told when any such use began or
ended and we are not told if it was continuous and uninterrupted,
nor whether it was regular, open or notorious.

In fact, her

entire affidavit is consistent with sporadic (and even permissive)
use in any event.
10.

Milton Kenneth Rogerson, who was a part-owner of

the Pines and a member of the Board of Directors, testified that
he has been acquainted with the property in question since 192 8
and has been a part-owner of the defendant since 1940. (T-81)
When asked regarding use prior to the mid-19 60's, he stated,
"Nobody used it without our permission." (T-113).
stated at page 113 of the transcript:
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He further

"Q.

Nobody objected?

A.

Yes, we objected.

Q.

How did you object?

A.

We objected because it was ours.

Q.

How did you object?

A.

There was no traffic on it.
MR. MADSEN:

Let him answer, Counsel.

A.
There was no purpose for anybody to go on our
property. For whatever they used it for they would
have to have used our property. That is the reason
we objected.
Q.
How did you object? Did you write letters, go
on the ground, kick them off?
A.

We kicked them off if we saw them.
11.

The said Rogerson also testified that the Gibbons

family had used the Gibbons property for sheep at some time in
the past, but that the sheep had been brought in from the south
and had left by the northwest gate, but that had not occurred
since about 19 50 or 1951.

Furthermore, this reference to the

Gibbons family was not to Ethel Gibbons and her husband as such,
but rather to the Gibbons family as a whole.

It was the Gibbons

family in the larger sense that was referred to by Rogerson and
he stated that Albert, who was representative for the Gibbons
family, admitted to Rogerson that he had no right of way. (T-10 5).
There was also testimony that the Gibbons family had used what
is referred to as the "Wilde Road", which was at a different
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location to the alleged road in question in this lawsuit.

It

should be noted that even in connection with the testimony concerning the ingress and egress of sheep, there is no testimony
as to how often it was used and no basis upon which to establish
a prescriptive easement by that activitiy, which has long since
been abandoned in any event.
12.

The aforesaid Rogerson also testified that in

approximately 1965 he met the plaintiff, George Q. Nielsen, on
the premises and told him that he was trespassing.

Plaintiff,

Nielsen, in his testimony admitted the encounter, but denied
portions of Rogerson's testimony in that regard. (T-9 3, 94, 116,
and 122).
13.

The said Rogerson testified that the Gibbons family

was a permissive user through the north gate on occasion. (T-104).
14.

Rogerson further testified with reference to the

northwest gate of the Pines property, that owners to the west
had used it to cross the Pines Ranch for purposes of keeping the
canal to their premises cleared each year.

As to its creation as

a road, he testified that this was accomplished in 1956 by Mr.
Wilde (T-83, 84), at which time Wilde obtained permission from
the Pines to remove timber through their property and he cut
the road for that purpose.

The remains of that road are appar-

ently visible in the photographs admitted in evidence, but
Rogerson testified that the so-called road as shown in the
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photographs ended 150 to 200
property in any event. (T-89).

yards from the plaintiffs'
He also testified that beyond

that point it wg.s at most a game trail.

He used the phrase

"indications of animal traffic," (T-85, 89). Nielsen even
characterized the supposed road as a "trail". (T-13).
ca^ls it a "path". (T-47)

Harrington

Walsh refers to a "trail", (T-55) but

isn't even sure of the location of the Gibbons property with
reference thereto.

Scott M. Matheson, owner of the lots just

west of the gate, testified that even at its beginning, the socalled road does not appear to be a road, but rather just a few
tire tracks. (T-73).

Herman Lund, a part-owner of the Pines

and the predecessor in interest of Matheson in the lots just to
the west of the said gate, refers to the so-called road as a
"horse-trail",. (T-80) as does Stevens. (T-25) .
The prerequisites in Utah to the establishment of a
prescriptive easement are clearly set forth in the case of Jensen
v. Gerrard, supra, in the following language found at page 487:
"Before a right of way can be acquired by prescription,
the use for the prescriptive period must be peaceable,
continuous, open, adverse as of right, and with the
knowledge and acquiescence of the plaintiff and his
grantors and predecessors in interest. Actual notice
to the owner of the servient estate is not necessary
if the user is so notorious that in the exercise of
reasonable diligence the owner should learn thereof;
then he will have constructive notice of the user
which is sufficient."
In the light of these prinqiples, it is abundantly
clear that the plaintiffs totally failed in their testimony to
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establish a prescriptive easement for at least the following
reasons:

> .
, 1.

The testimony totally fails to show a continuous,

uninterrupted use for a period of 20 years.

If the affidavit of

Ethel Gibbons is excluded, as it should be, all that remains is
an occasional use by George Q. Nielsen, Ronald Harrington and
William Ray Hauter since 19 62, which at best is a period of 14
years.

The testimony of Walsh's limited use likewise does not

meet the 20-year requirement as it commenced in 1936 and ended
in 1952, a period of 16 years.

The Walsh period and the Nielsen

period are interrupted by ten years of non-use from 1952 to 1962.
Even if Ethel Gibbons1 testimony were admissible, it does not
improve the situation because the period of her use is not
identified in terms of time of beginning or ending, nor does
her testimony establish that her use was continuous or regular,
uninterrupted, open or notorious, or peaceable, or that defendant
knew, or should have known, of such use.

It also fails to identify

the location or route used and how often such route or routes
were used.
2.

In addition to failing to show 20 years continuous/

uninterrupted use, the use testified to is only incidental and
sporadic in nature and is not such as to establish a prescriptive
easement in any event.

A review of the testimony of Nielsen,

Harrington and Hauter does not show the kind of use which is
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necessary to establish a prescriptive easement.

This use of

the property is occasional and temporary, and they do not show
any consistent activity unless it could be the removal of a
Christmas tree each year.

Even this activity takes place in

the winter when the occupants of the Pines Ranch are hampered
by snow from acquiring knowledge of the activities of Nielsen
and certainly cannot be said to have been aware thereof, except
for the one in3tance in which Rogerson happened to find Nielsen
on the property and told him that he was trespassing.

The

activity of Walsh is likewise of a sporadic nature only and
amounts to going on to the property one time per year to remove
a Christmas tree, and this we submit is not sufficient activity
to establish a prescriptive easement.

Even Ethel Gibbons1

affidavit does not establish the kind of activity which would
be required to establish a prescriptive easement because it
does not indicate that the actitities that she sets out in her
affidavit were other than incidental and temporary in nature.
3.

Finally, it should be observed that even if the

usage testified to by the plaintiffs was sufficient to make a
prima facie case, it is directly contradicted by the testimony
of Milton Kenneth Rogerson.

He testified that any use prior to

the mid-1960's was permissive and he stated that if they found
people on the property withoi^t permission they told them to
leave.

This, of course, creates a situation in any event of

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

conflicting testimony and under general rules of appellate
review, the decision of the trial court in this regard will
not be overturned.
The general rule is well established that in order to
obtain a prescriptive easement, the use must be continuous and
uninterrupted, and this means it must have substance and significance.

Whereas it is true that "what shall constitute such conti-

nuity can be stated only with reference to the nature and character
of the right claimed", it is nevertheless equally clear that a
prescriptive easement cannot be acquired by "occasional and
sporadic acts for temporary purposes".

The foregoing language

is taken from 25 Am Jur 2d, Easements, §56.

The reason for this,

at least in part, is that the use must have sufficient substance
and magnitude that the owner of the fee can reasonably be charged
with knowledge thereof.
by stealth.

A prescriptive easement cannot be obtained

In Zollinger v. Frank, 110 Ut 514, 175 P 2d 714 (1947)

the court at page 522 states that it is important to know "whether
the servient estate owner knew of should have known during the
entire prescriptive period that the claimant was using the claimed
right of way." (Emphasis added.)
In their Brief, plaintiffs cite the case of Cooper v.
Carter Oil Co., 7 Ut 2d 9, 316 P 2d 320 (1957) in which the Supreme
Court of Utah found adverse possession under circumstances which
consisted of grazing sheep upon the land in question for three
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weeks out of the year.

We do not think that that case supports

the plaintiffs' position at all.

First of all, it does not deal

with a prescriptive easement, and furthermore, under the circumstanqes of the case, the evidence disclosed that the land was
grazing land and that the grazing thereon was only good for three
weeks per year and, therefore, although the use was only three
weeks per year, it did, in fact, constitute 100% use of the
property,

In the instant case, we do not even have a use of

the property approaching three weeks per year.

Little more has

been done with the property than to occasionally remove a tree
at Christmas time. That amounts to a use of about one day per
year at most, in the wintertime when no one much is about and,
furthermore, there are not eveji ?Q continuous years of removing
the Christmas trees.
Further , the plaintiffs have subdivided the property
in question into 8 five-acre tracts for summer home use, and there
is no evidence whatsoever in this record that anyone ever slept
as much as one night on tjieir property.

Plaintiffs seek to

establish a right of way for use as a summer home subdivision,
but totally ignore the lack of any prior use of that nature, and
at the very least, summer home use or more exactly# lack of it,
is a significant factor in determining what past use will be held
to be sporadic, occasional or temporary.
Finally, it should be noted that plaintiffs admit their
claimed use was sporatic(Plaintiffs"brief, p.14).
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN FINDING THAT IN
RECENT YEARS THE USE MADE OF THE ALLEGED RIGHT OF WAY
WAS ESSENTIALLY PERMISSIVE AND THAT DEFENDANT HAS MADE
EVERY ATTEMPT IT COULD TO KEEP PEOPLE FROM TRESPASSING
ACROSS ITS LAND.
V

In its Findings of Fact, the trial court found that in

recent years the use made of the alleged right of way has been
essentially permissive, and that defendant has made every attempt
it could to keep people from trespassing across its land. (R-35).
This finding is fully supported by the evidence and we cite particularly the following items: .;..-.-.
1.

<

Since at least 1940, there has been a gate and fence

alonq the west boundary of the Pines Ranch to control access.
(T-85) .

^_

;

JU

-,;,..'

'.

;,.:

-;• ••

-

•••'!•

, * ; - . ;

There is a locked gate on the north boundary of

the Pines and "No Trespassing" sign.
,3*

>

(T-49, 50,92, 104).

Rogerson found plaintiff, George Q. Nielsen, on

the premises in about 1965 and complained to him that he was trespassing. (T-93, 94, 122).
4.

........

Rogerson testified that prior to the mid-1960's

no one entered the premises without permission and if persons were
found on the property without permission, they were "kicked off".
(T-113).
5.

Wilde constructed the road and used it to remove

timber during one season, all with permission of defendant. (T--83, 84)
6.

Rogerson testified that the Gibbons family were
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permissive users through the north and that the family spokesman acknowledged that the Gibbons had no right of way. (T-104, 105)
7.

All of the foregoing actions must be considered

in the light of the measures taken by the Stevens family and
their successors on the west to prevent access to their property,
all of which has resulted in cutting off access to the defendant's
west boundary.

But for the measures taken by the Stevens family,

more severe measures by defendant would perhaps have been appropriate as defendant might reasonably have been required to anticipate trespassers from the west.

It should be noted that the

Stevens people:
(a)

Maintained a fence and locked gate across the

north of their property for a t least the last 25 years. (T-9 ) .
(b)

Keys were given to those entitled to them, but

not to plaintiffs. (T-34).
(c)

The area to the west of the Pines gate has been

subdivided and sold to Matheson, who has put a locked chain
across the gate. (T-66-69).
Without arguing the matter further, it appears clear
that the record contains more than enough evidence to support the
aforesaid finding of the Court and, in fact, compels the finding
as set out in Point IV above.
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POINT III.
THE COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THIS CASE
DOES NOT FALL WITHIN RICHINS V. STRUHS.
In its Memorandum Decision,the trial court held that
this case does not fall within the decision of the Supreme Court
in the case of Richins v. Struhs, supra.
court was correct.

In this, the trial

The real issue in the Richins case was

whether the use was permissive or not permissive.

As we read

it/ that case stands for the proposition that when a claimant
has shown that his use has been open, notorious and continuous
for more than 20 years, that the "law presumes that the use is
adverse to the owner; and that it had a legitimate origin",
(page 359). That case, therefore, does not do away with the
requirement that the use be open, notorious, continuous and
adverse for over 20 years.

That; is still a condition precedent.

In the instant case, that requirement was never met and, therefore, the presumption never comes into effect. Furthermore,
the presumption is rebuttable, and under the circumstances of
this ca$e, it is respectfully submitted that any such presumption has been fully rebutted in any event.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DOES NOT DENY PLAINTIFFS
ACCESS TO THEIR PROPERTY NOR RENDER IT WORTHLESS. :i
In Point IV of their Brief, plaintiffs make a very
emotional appeal that the trial court has denied them access
to their property and rendered it worthless.

That is absurd.
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The trial court has only ruled, and properly so, that plaintiffs
failed to prove a prescriptive easement.

If plaintiffs1 property

is worthless without a prescriptive easement, it was not the
decision of the Court that brought it about.

If such is the

case, it was worthless before the Court ruled, as the Court
only declared the status between the parties in a declaratory
judgment action.

It appears, however, that plaintiffs can obtain

access to their property by eminent domain pursuant to Section
78-34-1(7), Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended.

They will,

of course, have to pay the reasonable value thereof, and the
right of way will have to be placed on the ground in a location
which will do the minimum of damage to defendant.
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In Point IV of their Brief, plaintiffs appear to complain that defendant is allowing livestock to graze on plaintiffs1
subdivision.

The record does not support that as a bona fide

complaint, but if indeed it is, there are proper means to deal
with it, but not in an action seeking a prescriptive easement.
Also in Point IV, plaintiffs raise the issue of what
was paid for their property.

Nielsen did not know the principal

amount that he paid for the land (T-21) and even if it were the
$7,000 total that he did refer to, there is no evidence that the
resulting cost of the land of $175 per acre for the 40 acres was
a reasonable price with right of way, but not without.

For all

the record shows, the $175 per acre price was based upon lack of
right of way and, in fact, it may be at a level which contemplates
an additional expenditure for a right of way.

It may indeed be

the plaintiffs who would be getting the "windfall" if the trial
court were to be reversed.
Plaintiffs allege in Point IV that defendant is guilty
of taking "all they can take, giving nothing in return."
is a totally unfounded and irresponsible statement.

That

If anyone

is trying to get something for nothing in this case, it would
appear to be the plaintiffs.

They are attempting, on the basis

of isolated, sporadic, and really inconsequential contacts with
the property (involving mainly the removal of an occasional
Christmas tree<—accomplished on foot or at most perhaps some-
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times by horseback) to subject defendant's property to a fullfledged right of way for motor vehicles to service a subdivision
of eight lots for summer home use for who knows how many people.
This is not fair play and it is not the law.. Even if there were
a right of way, the owner thereof cannot increase the burden on
the servient estate, and in the event of subdivision of the dominant estate, the easement does not inure to the benefit of the
owner of a parcel which, after the division, does not abut on the
way.

The Utah cases so hold.

In this case, the evidence did not

show right of way even going to the 40-acre tract as a unit, and
it certainly does not show that it went to each of the eight
five-acre tracts which have been subdivided from the orgina.1.
Undeniably, eight summer homes will constitute an increased burden under any circumstances.

In support of the foregoing, we

refer the court to the following cases: Wood v., Ashley, 122 Ut
580, 253 P 2d 351 (1952); and Nielsen v. Sandberg, 1Q5 Ut 93,
141 P 2d 696 (1943).
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the decision of the lower
court is fully supported by the evidence, that the decision is
a fair and just one, and respectfully pray that the Supreme
Court affirm the decision of the trial court.
DATED this 5th day of August, 1976.

GORDON A. MADSEN
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
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Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief to Richard
Richards, attorney for plaintiffs, at his address,1 2506 Madison
Avenue, Ogden, Utah

84401, postage prepaid, this

of August, 1976.

Attorney for Respondent
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